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Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts
Aggrieved citizens contemplating litigation usually face statutes requiring that they bring suit within a fixed number of years
after the claim accrues. Litigants who prosecute state claims find
that legislatures have enacted limitations for every action by
using provisions that restrict specific causes of action 1 and general
statutes that limit claims not otherwise covered. 2 Litigants suing
on a federal right, however, face a different statutory scheme.
Although federal statutes limit several specific federal causes of
action, 3 there are no general federal statutes of limitations. As a
result, some litigants in federal court press their claims unrestrained by any statute of limitations. 4
Yet such causes of action do not go unlimited. Traditionally,
federal courts have limite,d actions by borrowing a state statute
of limitations. Thus, when an otherwise unlimited federal claim
arises, the court treats it as if it had arisen under state law and
applies the appropriate state statute of limitations. 5 Federal
courts have used borrowing successfully for more than eighty
years. Recently, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged a
second method of limiting federal actions: in Occidental Life Insurance Co. u. EEOC6 the Court held that when a state statute
of limitations would "frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies, " 7 the right of action is to be limited by
standards like those of the equitable doctrine of !aches.
Occidental Life, undermining nearly a century of precedent,
raises important questions about the appropriate method of limiting actions in federal courts.
This Note studies limitations on federal actions in light of
Occidental Life. Part I discusses the reasons for limiting actions
1. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5801 (1970) (actions for recovery of real property);
§ 600.5807 (1970) (breach of contract actions).
2. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.5813 (1970) (all other personal actions).
3. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (Clayton antitrust claims); 35 U.S.C.§ 286 (1976)
(patent claims).
4. Examples include causes of action alleging employment discriminations(§ 706(d)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976); also
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)) and misrepresentation in the sale of securities (SEC rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1978), promulgated pursuant to§ !Ob of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976)).
5. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
~ 3.07 [2] (2d ed. 1978). See also text at notes 45-49 infra.
6. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
7. 432 U.S. at 367.
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and presents a short history ·of the limitation of actions. Part II
analyzes the alternatives for the federal courts when no statute
of limitations applies directly. Finally, the Note suggests a solution that will achieve a result most nearly consistent with both
the reasons for limiting actions and the proper role of the judiciary. It suggests, notwithstanding Occidental Life, that in some
situations courts should borrow specific federal statutes of limitations and that in the remainder they should continue the traditional practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations.

I. PURPOSES OF LIMITING ACTIONS
To evaluate the alternative means of placing a time limitation
on a cause .of action, one must understand the purposes of limiting actions. This Part discusses the three most important reasons
for governments to limit the lives of causes of action:
(1) to promote the achievement of substantive justice by the
courts;
(2) to provide stability to potential defendants and to society in
general; and
(3) to promote the efficient use of judicial resources. 8

The first reason to limit the life of a claim is to promote the
achievement of substantive justice by protecting the potential
defendants against "claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared." 9 Limiting the time period in which actions
may be prosecuted excludes stale claims and moldy evidence and
preserves the integrity of the fact-finding process.
Second, limiting actions provides stability. Temporal limitations, especially those of certain duration, assure potential defendants that t~ey will not be forced to live indefinitely with the
threat of a lawsuit. 10 One form of limitation, the statute of limitations, gives the potential defendant a precise day on which to
heave a sigh of relief. This sigh is protected at the expense of a
8. For discussion of the reasons for placing temporal limits on causes of action, see
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Callahan, Statutes of
Limitation-Background, 16 Omo ST. L.J. 130 (1955); Developments in the Law-Statutes
of Limitation, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments],
Note, An Interest Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitations, 49
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 313-14 (1974).
9. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). See Callahan,
supra note 8, at 138.
10. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805).
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possibly valid claim so that the sigher may plan his daily affairs
against a stable background. This stability also benefits society
at large. Often, many different people have a stake in the economic status of a potential defendant. A legal action can drastically change that status and affect the well-being of the defendant's associates. Therefore, many people are reluctant to deal
with others whose legal status is uncertain. Limitation of actions
minimizes the disruptive effects of such uncertainty on commercial intercourse. 11
Finally, limiting actions conserves judicial resources by
checking the caseload of the courts. 12 Restricting litigation eliminates claims from the trial docket, reduces crowded calendars,
and allows courts to concentrate on relatively current disputes. 13
Despite these strong reasons for imposing time limits on the
prosecution of claims, the common law courts did without them
for many years. In fact, the early equity courts took the first steps
in that direction when they began to conclusively presume payment of twenty-year old bonds and other specialties, effectively
barring actions not prosecuted within that time. 14 Courts of law
later followed equity's example and adopted this twenty-year
conclusive presumption. 15
The first express statutes of limitations applied only to realproperty actions. They established temporal barriers by reference
to certain notable events, such as royal coronations. 16 Not until
the reign of Henry VIII was the limitation period reduced to a
fixed interval between the accrual of the right and the commencement of the action. 17 The English colonies in America generally
adopted the British statute, and most kept it even after independence.18
Soon after the newly independent states ratified the Constitution in 1787, Congress began to enact legislation for the new
government. It created a system of federal courts 19 and estab11. Developments, supra note 8, at 1185.
12. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Developments, supra
note 8, at 1185; Note, supra note 8, at 302. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 142(1), Comment d (1971) (choice of law context).
13. Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REv.
33, 36 (1962). But see Callahan, supra note 8, at 135.
14. See generally 1 H. Wooo, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 1 (4th ed. 1916).
15. Id. See also Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N.Y. 381, 384 (1884).
16. 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2. ·
17. 32 Hen.VIII, c.2 (1540). See 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2.
18. 21 Jae. I, c. 16 (1623). See 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2 ..
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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lished private federal rights. 20 But all too often it failed to place
explicit time limits on those rights. Thus, the question of whether
limitations were intended, and, if so, how they were to be determined, was left to the courts.
·
II.

ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS WHEN No FEDERAL
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES DIRECTLY

When no statute of limitations explicitly covers a claim in a
federal court, the court may choose among five alternatives: 21
1) It may find that there is no limitation on the time during
which that action may be brought.
2) It may create its own "statute of limitations" to be applied to that claim and to all similar claims.
3) It may "borrow" a statute of limitations from another
federal claim and incorporate it as the relevant statute for the
claim in question.
4) It may "borrow" a statute of limitations from a state and
incorporate it as the relevant statute for the claim in question.
5) It may apply the equitable doctrine of !aches.

This Part suggests that the first two alternatives - no limit~tion and judicial legislation - are totally unacceptable. It then
suggests that each of the last three alternatives has some merit,
but that each poses difficult problems in some situations. The
final Part suggests a unified theory of borrowing to resolve these
problems.
1. No Limit

The first choice, to impose no temporal limits on actions, is
unworkable. When actions go unlimited, the legal system forgoes
the benefits of accuracy, stability, and efficiency that limitation
is designed to foster. The gains - greater equity for those whose
claims are valid even though old - have failed to impress American judges. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, said that to
allow someone to bring an action regardless of the lapse of time
"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws. In a country where not even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of'
20. E.g., Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (patents); Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, 1 Stat. 124 (copyright).
21. In addition to these limitations, a court could still invoke the twenty-year common law presumption. See text at notes 14-15 supra. See also Note, Disparities in 'l'ime
Limitation on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738, 744 (1940). While this would
establish a temporal barrier, few of the purposes of limiting actions would be adequately
served by such an extended period.
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three years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an individual
would remain forever liable to pecuniary forfeiture." 22 Moreover,
even though many federal actions are unlimited, Congress has
long acquiesced in the practice of borrowing state limitations,
suggesting a legislative preference for limited actions. 23
2. Judicially Legislated Limitations

The second option, to allow the courts to formulate temporal
limitations for broad classes of federal rights, would fulfill most
purposes of limiting actions. Indeed, because courts are in a position to see many important effects24 of any given limitation period, they are well-placed to set specific time limits.
The only difficulty with this approach is its concentration of
quasi-legislative authority in the hands of the federal judiciary.
At the heart of the problem is the distinction between legislative
and judicial powers. Generally speaking, a court investigates,
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on facts before it
and under laws already existing. 25 A legislature, on the other
hand, provides for the future by creating, sometimes arbitrarily,
a rule to be applied thereafter. The creation of a fixed-period
limitation on actions, necessarily an arbitrary task, is properly
characterized as legislative action.
Alone, this does not preclude action by a federal court, whose
occasional authority to act legislatively has long been recognized. 26 Some of the legislative power of the federal courts is constitutionally rooted; 27 the remainder has been conferred on the
courts, explicitly or implicitly, by Congress. 28 The Constitution
22. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336,341 (1805). See also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895), where the Court rejected the notion of a class of plaintiffs
whose causes of action are subject to no temporal limitations.
23. See note 124 infra; Einhorn & Feldman, Choosing a Statute of Limitations in
Federal Securities Actions, 25 MERCER L. REv. 497 (1974).
24. Docket control, however, is not the only aim of statutes of limitations. See text
at notes 8-13 supra.
25. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
26. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 2-2, at 16 (1978); P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, P. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S Tm: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 786 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
27. E.g., the power to create rules of decision for admiralty cases derived from U.S.
CoNST. art. ill, § 2. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 3-31 at 116; HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 26, at 786.
28. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 3-31 at 115-16. See also Van Alstyne, The Role of

Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause", 36 QHIO ST. L.J. 788-94
(1975). An example of such legislative power is the ability of the Supreme Court to devise
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contains no explicit grant of power to establish limitations on the
prosecution of actions. Thus, if the federal courts have any such
power, it has been conferred on them by Congress.
But Congress has never delegated this power to the courts.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this in UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp. 29 The plaintiff labor union, arguing that incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law30 contended that a borrowed state statute of limitations should not bar its claim. Instead, the union asked the Court
to create a uniform limitation period to close the gap left by
Congress. Although the Court recognized that section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act31 represented a broad grant to
the courts of power to fashion labor law, 32 it held that it could
infer no congressional intent that the judiciary set a limitation
period. 33 Viewing the proposal as one for "drastic ... judicial
legislation, 1134 the Court concluded that "the teaching of our cases
does not require so bald a form of judicial innovation. 1135
This is the proper view. While Congress arguably could confer upon the courts a power to create fixed periods of limitation,
there has never been any indication that it has intended to do so.
In the absence of explicit congressional authorization, the courts
ought not to assume that they possess such legislative power. 311
rules of civil procedure for the federal courts pursuant to the Enabling Act, Act of June
19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. The Court has acknowledged that this power is congressionally delegated. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). See generally
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 CotuM. L. REV, 905
(1976).
29. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
30. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
31. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1976).
32. 383 U.S. at 701.
33. 383 U.S. at 701-04.
34. 383 U.S. at 703.
35. 383 U.S. at 701. But see Justice White's dissent, where he argues that the § 301
delegation was meant to include the power to fashion limitations, 383 U.S. at 710, and
that the Court should be free to draw on any source, including state and federal statutes,
in devising such limitations, 383 U.S. at 714. In at least one case, the Supreme Court has
suggested that in extraordinary circumstances, federal courts could create "statutes" of
limitations. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court applied admiralty
!aches to a personal injury suit arising from an accident on a coastal oil rig. 1rt' declining
to create a specific· limitation period, the Court stated that "laJ special federal statute
of limitations is created, as a matter of federal common law, only when the need for
uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal right demands a particular sort of statute of limitations." 404 U.S. at 104. See also De Malherbe v. International
Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
36. See also Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engrs,, 198
F. Supp. 911, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1961), revd. on other grounds, 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965),
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3. Federal Borrowing

A third option is to borrow an express federal statute of limitations that governs a cause of action similar to that at issue.
Although such an approach has never been used in a civil action
at law, it has supplied the limitation in at least one maritime
action, McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 37 In that case a
seaman combined an action for unseaworthiness with a Jones
Act38 claim for negligence. The Jones Act claim was limited by a
three-year federal statute, 39 while the unseaworthiness action was
not limited by any federal provision. Principles of res judicata
prohibited the prosecution of the Jones Act claim and the unseaworthiness claim in separate actions. Because of this, the Court
noted that for those wishing to press both claims, giving effect to
the state's two-year statute for the unseaworthiness claim would
effectively preempt the three-year Jones Act provision and the
congressional policy expressed therein. Consequently, it held that
the unseaworthiness claim would be limited by the three-year
statute governing the Jones Act claim. 40
Borrowing an analogous federal limitations period is appropriate for some causes of action created by judicial implication. 41
In such claims, one cannot infer that congressional creation of an
unlimited right of action reveals an intent to conform to the historical practice of borrowing limitations from state laws; in these
cases Congress has had no opportunity to consider enacting its
own explicit limitation period. Therefore, courts should not rush
to apply the general rule of state limitation borrowing to implied
causes of action.
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966); Bayles, On Legal Reform: Legal Stability and Legislative Questions 65 KY. L.J. 631,650-1 (1977); Hill, State Procedural Law in Nondiversity
Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66, 94 (1953); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations
Provisions, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 68, 75 (1953); Note, supra note 21, at 745.
37. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
38. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1976).
39. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), incorporates the three-year statute of
limitations of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976).
40. 357 U.S. at 225. The Court, however, did not consider whether a state period
longer than the Jones Act period could be applied. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.
383 U.S. ·595, 704 n.6 (1966). The Court's reasoning in McAllister indicates that such a
period could be applied since it would not frustrate the policy of the Jones Act.
41. For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946), the court inferred a cause of action under SEC rule l0b-5. See also J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (right of action under § 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (misleading proxy solicitations)). See q.lso Friendly, In
Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. '353, 421 (1964).
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This is particularly true when a court infers a cause of action
from a federal statutory system that has its own specific statute
of limitations. 42 In such circumstances, the court creates a judicially enforceable right because it believes that such a right is
necessary to effectuate federal policy. 43 Because the statute limiting the entire scheme suggests boundaries to that policy, it is
sensible to apply that statute to all implied offspring of that
policy. 44
4. State Borrowing

The fourth possibility is to borrow state statutes of limitation. Unlike federal borrowing, state borrowing is well-defined by
usage and today provides the general rule for limiting otherwise
unlimited federal actions. The federal courts have borrowed state
statutes since early in the nineteenth century. In M'Cluny v.
Silliman, 45 a case grounded in diversity jurisdiction, a registrar of
a United States land office was sued for malfeasance. Referring
to the Rules of Decision Act, 46 the Court held the action barred
by a six-year Ohio statute oflimita.tions: "Under this statute, the
acts of limitations of the several states, where no special provision
has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the Courts
of the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is
given in the state Courts."47 A borrowed state statute of limitations was first used to limit a suit to enforce a / ederal right in
1895. In Campbell v. Haverhill 48 the Court applied a six-year
Massachusetts statute to bar a patent infringement claim. Noting that the Rules of Decision Act consistently had been held to
require application of state statutes to limit state law rights as, 42. Causes of action under SEC rule lOb-5, for example, would meet this test since
16 of the 1934 Act contains an explicit statute of limitations. See note 73 infra.
43. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
44. The decision as to which federal statute of limitations to adopt might cause
problems similar to those discussed in the text at notes 58-64 infra. Here, however, any
confusion could be settled by the Supreme Court, whose choice of federal statutory periods
would, as an interpretation of the underlying federal statute, be nationally applicable.
45. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
46. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)): "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply." The Act was amended in 1948 adding the words "civil actions" in place
of the phrase "trials at common law." See note 55 infra.
47. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277.
48. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
§
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serted in federal court, the Court held that the Act also authorized state law limitation of federal causes of action. 49 Thus, when
Congress has not spoken directly, a court is not without guidance.
The Rules of Decision Act directs it to rely "on the State's wisdom
in setting a limit . . . on the prosecution of a closely analogous
claim."50
But the literal terms of the Rules of Decision Act do not
provide a completely satisfactory justification for limitation borrowing for all federal claims. Historically, statutes of limitations
have not applied to suits in equity, 51 and therefore the Court has
refused to apply such state statutes to federal rights whose sole
remedy is equitable. 52 Moreover, whether the Rules of Decision
Act itself has any relevance to equitable claims is still a topic of
debate. By its own terms the Act applied to "trials at common
law;" 53 it said nothing about suits in equity. 54 Even after congressional modification of the Act in 1948 to include "civil actions"
generally, the view that the Act should apply to equitable and
maritime actions has received little, if any, acceptance. 55
Recently, courts have failed to state the basis of their use of
limitation borrowing. Although they have not rejected the Rules
of Decision Act as a justification, they have tended to ignore it
49. 155 U.S. at 620. Two important provisos to the general rule of limitation borrowing should be noted. First, federal courts need not borrow statutes that discriminate
against or are hostile to federal rights. For example, in Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159
F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1946), the court considered a South Carolina statute of limitations
providing six years in which to bring an action of a contract, obligation, or liability unless
such contract, obligation, or liability was created by federal statute, in which case. the
period was one year. The court held that the one-year statute should not be applied. See
Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), a//d.,327 U.S. 610, 615
(1895).
Second, the limitation period must be reasonable. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock
Co., 132 F. 434, 438 (8th Cir. 1904). It must afford full opportunity to sue before the bar
takes effect. Dubuque Packing Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. lowa),
affd., 233 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1956).
50. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975).
51. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). See note 91 infra.
52. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 463 (1955) (Reed, J.,
concurring). This reasoning also applies to maritime rights. Finley v. United States, 244
F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1957). See note 90 infra.
53. See note 46 supra.
54. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940).
55. See note 46 supra. While the change would seem to require limitation borrowing
in equitable and maritime actions, such a view has never received much support. Furthermore, by looking to congressional intent and the historic procedural autonomy of equity
and admiralty courts, a persuasive argument can be made for maintaJning the distinction
between legal and other actions. See Hill, supra note 36, at 113-15.

0
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and to treat the doctrine as an aspect of judge-made law. 56 The
Supreme Court has been indifferent toward the statute in recent
limitation borrowing cases and has limited its discussion to underlying policy values. 57
The practice of borrowing state statutes to limit federal
causes of action poses two significant problems. The first is to
determine which state statute of limitations ought to be borrowed
to limit a particular federal cause of action. The second is to
maintain uniformity among courts in different states enforcing
the same federal right.
The courts agree that the objective in choosing a state statute
of limitations is to borrow the one that best effectuates the federal
policy at issue. 58 In seeking an appropriate state limitation period,
courts follow two courses: the passive and active approaches.
When using the passive approach, 59 the court first examines
the nature of the federal cause of action. 60 It then examines the
state's catalogue of limitations, determines which statute would
apply to a similar state claim, 61 and applies that statute to the
federal claim. This approach comports with the interpretation
that has been given the Rules of Decision Act. 62
A court using an active approach63 assumes a more legislative
posture in determining which state limitation period should
apply. The court begins, as do courts using the passive approach,
by identifying those state statutes that govern claims similar to
the federal claim at issue. Instead of selecting the most analogous
statute, however, an active court establishes a group comprising
all statutes governing state claims that bear a minimum degree
56. E.g., Holmberg v. Armbreclit, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946): "The implied absorption
of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase
of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial
determination within the general framework offamiliar legal principles." See also Einhorn
& Feldman, supra note 23, at 497.
57. Note the lack of reference to the Act in recent important limitation borrowing
cases such as Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); and UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696 (1966).
58. E.g., Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 852 (1970).
59. See also text at notes 68-71 infra.
• 60. The court determines the characteristics of, and the elements which give rise to,
the completed cause of action. Federal law governs the characterization question. See
Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1959).
61. Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967).
62. See text at notes 5 & 48-50 supra.
63. See also text at notes 72-74 infra.
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of similarity to the federal claim at issue. To choose a statute
from the group, the court weighs other factors it feels deserve
consideration - most notably the social, economic, and political
policies underlying the federal right, and the lengths of the periods prescribed by the various statutes - and selects the statute
that best reflects these considerations. 64 ·
A good illustration of the difficulties that can come up under
either the passive or the active approach to borrowing state statutes of limitations is the problem of limitations for SEC rule lOb5 securities actions, 65 presently one of the more confused areas of
federal law.
A court using a passive approach often must choose among
a large number of limitation statutes. 66 In cases arising under rule
lOb-5, alternatives 67 include state statutes of limitations governing actions for fraud, blue sky claims, 68 liability created by statute, 69 general civil causes of action (e.g., contract, personal injury,
etc.), and claims not covered by other provisions. The court must
select the statute that a state court would apply if the right in
question were the creation of the state, rather than the federal
legislature. In a lOb-5 case, it considers factors such as the presence of provisions similar to rule lOb-5 in the state blue sky law,
parallels between lOb-5 actions and securities actions, and parallels between lOb-5 actions and fraud actions. 7°Courts strive to be
64. E.g., United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1004 (1973): "[T]he broad remedial policies of the federal securities laws are best
served by a longer, not a shorter, statute of limitation." See also De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
65. "Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud by any person who makes a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; rule l0b-5 thus
extends its protection to both buyers and sellers of securities wherever the trading occurs."
Comment, Statutes of Limitatiom in lOB-5 Actions: A Proposal for Congressional
Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1154, 1156-57 (1973) (emphasis original).
66. See generally Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private
Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5: Complexity in Need of Reform,39 Mo. L. REv.165 (1974);
Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23; Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions:
Complications Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967); ·comment, supra note
65; Comment, A Cry for Help: The Ninth Circuit and the Statute of Limitations in lOb-5
Actions, 22 UCLA L. REV. 947 (1975).
•
67. See Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 499.
68. Blue sky laws are state statutes regulating securitities. See J. MoFSKY, BLUE SKY
RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 1, 3 n.1 (1971).
69. E.g., CAL. CIV. Pao. CooE § 338 (West Supp. 1978): "An action upon a liability
created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture."
70. Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 503. The task may now be somewhat easier.
For a while the circuits differed as to whether scienter was an element of the l0b-5 cause
of action. In Ernst & Ernst v._ Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held
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objective in such determinations, but because there are not, and
never can be, clear guidelines to explain when two things are
"similar," there is room for reasonable differences of opinion.7 1
The latitude is even greater for a court that uses the active
approach. The court begins with the same list of "similar" statutes as a passive court, but the process of weighing is far more
complicated. Similarity is only one of many criteria for selection.
Some courts, favoring longer limitation periods, have borrowed
general fraud statutes and applied them to lOb-5 actions. 72 Others
have relied on congressional indications that short limitation periods are most appropriate for securities actions73 to justify borrowing different statutes. This discrepancy illustrates the greater
freedom of "active" courts to pick and choose among alternatives,
and perhaps to justify their choice by reference to their own notions of what legislative intent ought to have been, as well as to
evidence of what legislative intent actually was. It is not surprising that there is little agreement concerning the appropriate period for lOb-5 actions. 74
As the lOb-5 cases show, the general standard of limitation
borrowing - choosing the statute that best effectuates the federal
policy at issue75 - has been too malleable to provide guidance.
The Supreme C_ourt could improve the situation by specifying
that scienter is an element of the cause of action in suits by private litigants. As a result,
it may be more likely that courts will characterize l0b-5 actions as actions for fraud. In
the case of rule lOb-5, the state law ultimately selected is commonly either a statute of
limitations covering actions for fraud or one covering actions under blue sky statutes, See
Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 500-04. See also Bateman & Keith, supra note 66,
at 174.
71. An additional problem exists when a state changes its statutory scheme after a
court has determined which limitation period to borrow. Some courts have shown a reluctance to change the federal limitation to bring it into line with the new state law. E.g.,
United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1004
(1973); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Univs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912,916 (9th Cir. 1971); Smith
v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
72. See, e.g., United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir,), cert denied,
414 U.S. 1004 (1973) (the court selected a three-year fraud statute, CAL, C1v. Pao. Con&§
338 (West Supp. 1978), over a one-year-after-discovery securities fraud (blue sky) statute,
CAL. CokP. ConE § 25506 (West Supp. 1978)).
73. Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976) (relating to false
or misleading registration statements, prospectuses, and communications), sets a limit of
one year after discovery within a maximum of three years; and § 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976) (relating to insider trading), sets a two•
year limit.
74. For a case in which the court faced several of these variables, see Bailey v, Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 475 (D. Minn. 1976).
· 75. See text at note 58 supra.
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whether courts should take an active or a passive role. The passive approach best promotes the values of stability and efficiency, 76 as long as state legislatures set sensible periods for the
prosecution of state claims. 77 This approach also keeps legislatively minded judges from using limitation borrowing as a mask
for the creation of limitation periods by judicial fiat. 78
In addition to the difficulties of selecting the correct state
statute of limitations, some courts79 and commentators80 see a
second problem: limitation borrowing establishes a different limitation period for each state. This lack of uniformity can increase
the profitability of forum shopping. 81 Because defendants are
often amenable to suit in more than one state, a: plaintiff whose
delay has precluded suit in one jurisdiction may sometimes prosecute his action in another.
For example, in a civil action under rule lOb-5, suit may be
brought where any act or transaction involved in the violation
occurred, or where the defendants reside or transact business. 82 A
plaintiff suing a national corporation could conceivably bring suit
in any of a dozen jurisdictions and might select one to obtain a
longer limitation period. 83 A plaintiff possessing a right of action
against two defendants may be allowed to proceed against one
but be barred against the other solely because their home states
provide different limitation periods.
The problem of forum shopping, however, should not be overstated. Borrowing statutes, enacted by most states, limit the
76. See text at notes 48-50 supra.
77. See text at note 50 supra. Statutes of limitations that discriminate against federal
rights or are manifestly unreasonable need not be borrowed,. See note 49 supra.
78. See text at notes 25-36 supra.
79. H.L. Green Co. v. McMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962).
80. Bateman & Keith, supra note 66, at 181; Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at
508; Comment, supra note 65, at 1161; Note, supra note 21, at 739:
81. The problem of forum shopping results from a lack of one type of "uniformity,"
national uniformity, by which the same limitation period would govern a cause of action
throughout the country. Limitation borrowing, however, affects at least two other types
of "uniformity": first, consistency within the federal scheme of limitations between similar causes of action, see, e.g., text at note 73 supra; and, second, consistency within a .state
between the limitation periods of the federal right and of similar state rights, see De
Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); Regan v. Sullivan, 417 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), revd. on other
grounds, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977).
82. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
83. A plaintiff aware of a potential cause of action may wish to wait as long as possible
to see whether the securities gain or lose, speculating at the expense of the defendant. See
Bateman & Keith, supra note 66, at 181.
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benefits plaintiffs can derive from forum shopping. 84 A borrowing statute permits a state's courts to bar an action if another
state, often the state where the right accrued, has a statute barring that action. 85 Thus, a plaintiff who is barred in one state
may find himself barred in all. Moreover, federal courts that
borrow a state statute of limitations also borrow the state's borrowing statute. 86 Admittedly, since not all states have borrowing statutes, and since those that exist may differ in terms, some
loopholes remain. Nevertheless, these statutes close many gaps
and limit the advantages of forum shopping. Moreover, had
forum shopping alarmed Congress, the legislators could have
prevented the problem by passing an explicit, uniform statute
of limitations. This is undoubtedly why most authorities do not
consider limitation periods characteristics of a substantive right,
but rather procedural details governing the remedy that vindicates the right. 87
Because these two shortcomings of limitation borrowing from
state statutes are minimal, and because the procedure fulfills
almost all of the objectives of temporal limitation of actions, the
courts have made it their standard rule of limitation and Congress has acquiesced in that decision. Occidental Life, 88 however,
creates an important exception to this well-established practice
by holding that the general rule is not to be applied when the
application of state limitations periods would "frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." 89 The Court
announced a new standard that is not given a formal name by the
84. R.CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 190 (2d ed. 1976). See also
Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 62 N.C. L. REv. 489, 619-33 (1974).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142, Comment f (1971).
86. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Korn v. Merrill, 403 F. Supp. 377, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd., 538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.1976); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
235 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Colo. 1964).
87. Statutes of limitations may be characterized as either substantive or procedural.
Generally they have been viewed as procedural, governing the remedy, not the right, and
thus justify a forum in imposing its statute of limitations on foreign causes of action. Some
statutes of limitations, however, have been viewed as limiting the substantive right, not
merely the remedy. These are either contained within the statute creating the right sued
upon or in a separate statute explicitly limiting that right. See Michigan Ins. Bank v.
Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 696 (1889); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886); J. ANGELL, A
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW § 22 (6th ed. 1876); H. Woon, supra note
14, § 9. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142, 143 (1971) (conflict of
laws rules for statutes of limitations). Borrowed statutes of limitations should not be
considered as substantive limitations of federal rights because they are not directed at
federal rights.
88. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See also text at notes 6-7 supra.
89. 432 U.S. at 367.
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Court but that strikingly resembles the venerable equitable doctrine of !aches.
·
5. Laches
Use of the doctrine of !aches forms the last approach to limiting federal actions at law; 90 in light of Occidental Life, it deserves
particular attention. In its traditional equitable form, laches
comprises two elements: inexcusable delay by the plaintiff in
bringing suit and prejudice to the defendant resulting from that
delay. 91
90. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280,
287 (1940). The doctrine oflaches also applies in maritime actions. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh
Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1872). See
also Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56
B.U. L. REV. 970 (1976).
91. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951); Potash Co. of America v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1954); Note, supra note
90, at 971. Passage of time is the heart of !aches. Some courts have gone so far as to deny
relief for reasons of delay alone, usually by presuming prejudice, acquiescence, or waiver.
E.g., Wolstenhouse v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. 2d 48, 51, 351 P.2d 321, 323, 4 Cal. Rptr.
153, 155 (1960) (prejudice presumed from delay) (overruled on this point by Conti v. Board
of Civil Serv. Commrs., 1 Cal. 3d 351, 461 P.2d 617, 82 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969)); Monk v.
Gillenwater, 141 W.Va. 27, 33, 87 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1955) (delay as evidence of assent,
acquiescence, or waiver). See also W.WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY§ 102, at472-73 (193Q);
Note, 61 W.VA. L.REv. 126, 128 (1958); 6 ARK. L. REv. 60 (1951-52). And while statutes of
limitations for actions at law are technically inapplicable to equity claims, in courts of
concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction "equity has usually considered the passage of
time equivalent to the comparable statute of limitations as presumptive of !aches."
Developments, supra note 8, at 1184. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947);
Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 56 (1838). See also Note, supra
note 90, at 974-76.
For most courts, however, mere lapse of time is insufficient to demonstrate !aches.
They require in addition that the defendant prove some change in condition during the
period of delay. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 509 (1913); Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698 (1898); McGrann v. Allen, 291 Pa. 574, 578, 140 A. 552,
553 (1928); H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY§ 28 (2d ed. 1948); 2
J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 419(d) (5th ed. 1941). By refusing to find !aches
absent legally cognizable prejudice, a court may grant relief even though an extended
period 9f time has lapsed between the accrual and the enforcement of the right of action.
E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) (twenty-two years between the
accrual of the right and the affixing of a trust status on shares of stock held by a corporation); Shaffer v. Rector Well Equip. Co., 155 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1946) (eight years on
patent infringement action); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 52 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1951) (seven
years in suit for overdue support payments).
In determining whether or not !aches applies, the trial judge must rely on his own
discretion, looking to the facts and equities peculiar to the case. Gardner v. Panama R.R.,
342 U.S. 29 (1951); Potash Co. of America v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213
F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1954). Cf. Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936)
(comparing the application of !aches to the doctrine of equitable tolling).
Laches often provides the only limitation on an equitable remedy. In many cases,
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Before Occidental Life, the Supreme Court had not applied
laches, an equitable doctrine, to federal actions at law lacking
congressional limitations. 92 In Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 93 the trial court applied
a laches test to an action for damages under section 303(b) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.94 Relying on the "often
expressed policy favoring a single uniform, national labor law," 95
it refused to borrow the state limitation period. 98 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected that view, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 97 The laches approach appeared dead. Only twelve years later, however, the Supreme Court
brought the doctrine back to Occidental Life. 98 It held that laches
would supply the limitation period when borrowing a state statute would frustrate federal policy. In Occidental Life, the EEOC,
acting pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 99
prosecuted an individual's claim of employment discrimination,
but the district court held the action barred by a borrowed oneyear California statute of limitations. 100 More than three years of
EEOC investigation and conciliation had passed between the
employee's complaint and the EEOC suit.
however, statutes establish temporal limits on equitable remedies. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1166
(19761 (placing a six-year limit on suits by the United States to annul land patents); 17
U.S.C. § 507 (1976) (placing a three-year limit on all "civil actions" for copyright infringe•
ment). In such cases, the statute of limitations, supplementing- rather than supplanting
- the doctrine of laches, creates a period beyond which suit will not lie, but within which
laches may yet deny relief. See Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 318 (1904); Alsop v.
Riker, 155 U.S. 488, 461 (1894); 2 J. POMEROY, supra, § 419(b); Hill, supra note 36, at 113;
9 TEXAS L. REV. 93 (1930).
92. E.g., Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473,475 (D. Colo, 1973); St. Louis-S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Miller Floors, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 867 (D. Okla. 1968); H. McCLINTOCK, supra
note 91, § 28 at 75:
The majority of the courts which have considered the question, have refused to
enjoin an action at law on the ground of the !aches of the plaintiff at law. The small
number of cases in which an injunction was sought indicates the general opinion
that such relief would not be granted.
93. 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
94. Now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 181(b) (1976).
95. 198 F. Supp. at 913.
96. 198 F. Supp. at 915.
97. 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. nom. C.D. Draucker, Inc. v. Inter•
national Union of Operating Engrs., 384 U.S. 904 (1966).
98. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See text at notes 88-89 supra.
99. · 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1976).
100. The Court applied CAL. CJV. Pao. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1977), a general
statute of limitations covering, among other things, injury caused by the wrongful act of
another. The district court's opinion is reported as EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1298 (M.D. Cal. 1974).
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The Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court reversal of that
decision. The Court recognized that one goal of Title VII was to
obtain the cooperation and voluntary compliance of employers,
and that Congress had established an administrative procedure
to effectuate that goal. Moreover, "[u]nlike the typical litigant
against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run,
the EEOC is required by law to refrain from commencing a civil
action until it has discharged its administrative duties. " 101 The
Court noted that applying the borrowed one-year statute of limitations would frustrate the federal policy of informally resolving
employment discrimination claims. 102 Accordingly, it specified
that such suits would be limited by the doctrine of laches.
It is understandable that the Court was attracted to the flexibility of laches. After all, the Court itself has described the doctrine as the power "to locate a 'just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case." 103 But examination of the doctrine
in light of the purposes of limiting actions reveals that laches is
not the most desirable alternative. It is therefore regrettable that
the Court endorsed it.
One drawback of laches is that it fails to provide stability to
the defendant and the society with which he interacts. 104 A statute
of limitations, in contrast, simplifies the question of diligent prosecution, 105 which has been determined in actions at law solely 106
by reference to the objective statutory time pericid. 107 "If an action
be brought the day before the statutory time expires, it will be
sustained; if a day after, it will be defeated." 108 But under the
doctrine of laches, the parties must wait until after the trial judge
determines whether it would be "just" to allow the action to
proceed. Thus laches cannot provide the predictability that is a
101. 432 U.S. at 368. The Court also concluded that EEOC notice provisions adequately protect defendants against undue hardship and surprise. 434 U.S. at 372.
102. 432 U.S. at 368-69.
103. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1976), quoted in 432 U.S. at
373. This relates to the first purpose of limiting actions, providing substantive justice on
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. See text at note 9 supra.
104. See text at notes 10-11 supra.
105. In one sense, statutes of limitations can be seen as liquidated !aches. See West
v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 177, 96 P. 932, 935 (1908).
106. One can argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling, discussed in note 111 infra,
tempers a statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the statute itself still provides the means
for objectively determining when a right of action expires.
'
107. Prior to Occidental Life, one could always ftnd a statute of limitations, either
congressionally enacted or, in the case of certain federal actions, borrowed from the states,
to cover any legal action.
108. Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 317 (1904).
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fundamental purpose oflimitation of actions. 109 Moreover, laches
fails to conserve judicial resources. 110 Plaintiffs who are uncertain
as to whether their claims will be barred may be more likely to
file suit. Furthermore, in order to decide whether laches should
bar a claim, a court must spend additional time hearing evidence
concerning justifiability of the delay and the existence of prejudice - time that would seldom be spent if an objective limitation
were used. 111
109. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 435 (1965). Cf. Note, supra
note 21, at 744 (inherently subjective nature oflaches produces a lack of uniformity among
the courts).
110. See text at notes 12-13 supra.
111. This has been true in the cases following Occidental Life. One court has gone so
far as to hold that "[w)hether the commission's delays caused prejudice that will justify
a limitation of relief •.. can best be considered after the facts have been fully developed,
if the commission prevails." EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 574 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir.
1978). This holding requires a full hearing on the merits before any question of !aches is
reached. See also EEOC v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 577 F.2d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1978).
But see Callahan, supra note 8, at 135.
In addition to statutes of limitations and the doctrine of !aches, the doctrine of
equitable tolling also affects limitations of actions. Equitable tolling mitigates the arbitrary effects of statutes of limitations by preserving the right of action in appropriate
cases. As announced in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874), equitable
tolling provides that in actions for fraud, both at law and in equity, statutes of limitations
do not begin to run against the injured party until such time as he discovers, or in the
exercise of due diligence ought to have discovered, the concealed fraud. See also Traer v.
Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 537 (1885); Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 190 (1884).
The doctrine, however, has not been limited to fraud situations. Circumstances that
'will suspend or postpone the running of a statute of limitations include fraudulent concealment, ~stoppel, waiver, absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction, disability (e.g.,
infancy, insanity, imprisonment) of the plaintiff, and the death of either party. See Deuelopments, supra note 8, at 1220-33. See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974) (the filing of a class action later dismissed as improper was held to toll
the statute of limitations with respect to a plaintiff who later filed the suit individually);
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (FELA action was begun in a state
court having jurisdiction. The defendant was served with process but the case was dismissed for improper venue. The FELA time limitation was held tolled while the state suit
pended and until the state court order dismissing the action became final).
The use of tolling, which is said to be grounded in a "sound and philosophical view
of the principles of [statutes] of limitations," Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342,
349 (1874), prevents the statute from running when the plaintiffs delay in properly instituting suit is justifiable. In addition, since the circumstances that justify tolling can be
clearly explicated, the use of tolling maintains the certainty provided by statutes of
limitations in determining when an action is barred. Consider this comparison of !aches
and tolling: "The rules governing [tolling] are more clearly defined and are less flexibly
applied than those governing !aches. . . . The defense of laches is directed more intimately to the conscience of the chancellor, and whether it shall prevail rests in his discretion." Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936).
It should also be noted that while state law determines the applicable limitation
period in borrowing situations, federal law determines the circumstances that will toll the
statute. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94,
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Nevertheless, in Occidental Life the Supreme Court applied
a laches standard to a situation where state statutes had formerly
provided the time limitation. In so doing the Court discarded over
eighty years of precedent requiring state borrowing and transplanted the equitable doctrine of laches into the alien realm of
actions at law. 112 Moreover, the change was not necessary. The
Court could have held that a borrowed state statute oflimitations
was tolled while the charge was processed through the EEOC's
administrative machinery (as long as that period of time was not
unreasonable).11 3 Alternatively, the Court could have followed the
reasoning of its earlier decision in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc. 114 and advised the EEOC to file suit and "to request
a stay until the administrative procedure is completed." 115 Either
approach would have protected not only the federal policy of
informally resolving employment discrimination claims, but also
the integrity of the limitation borrowing doctrine; and either
approach would have been preferable to that adopted by the
Court. 116
103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied., 394 U.S. 928 (1969). But see Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462-64 (1975).
112. See text at notes 92-97 supra.
113. See note 111 supra.
114. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
115. 421 U.S. at 465.
116. This is not to say that the Johnson approach of seeking a stay of the action
pending administrative attempts to resolve the issue is as desirable as the tolling approach.
The issue in Johnson was whether equitable tolling, discussed in note 111 supra,
applies to Title VII and § 1981 actions. See note 4 supra. Although separate causes of
action, they require the same factual allegations and the right to relief in each depends
on the same findings. See Note, Employment Discrimination-Statute of Limitations
Under Section 1981 Not Tolled by Filing of Charges with EEOC Under Title VIII, 1976
Wis. L. REV. 288, 303. Before being allowed to sue under Title VII, however, a person is
required to proceed through an administrative procedure within the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (f) (1) (1976).
Acknowledging a congressional policy of encouraging the use of this procedure before
suit, several courts had held that the filing of a Title VII charge tolled the statute of
limitations for§ 1981. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 648 (5th Cir.
1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974); Macklin
v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc. 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ripp v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 214 (N.D. Ala. 1973). This had been done with the
understanding that "the broad purposes of statutes of limitations . . . are not frustrated
by [tolling]." Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court held tolling inappropriate in equal employment actions. It did so because the Title VII cause of action that was filed was not "exactly
the same" as the § 1981 cause of action later asserted. 421 U.S. at 467.
On this issue, Justice Marshall's dissent provides a sounder analysis than that of the
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In the future, Occidental Life should be limited to its facts.
The Court's reasoning should apply only when federal pre-suit
procedures, such as the EEOC's•conciliation process, are used to
vindicate federal rights. For the moment, however, one is left with
the Court's suggestion that any potential frustration of federal
policy may require the application of laches rather than limitation borrowing. It also remains to be seen whether any judicial
belief that a state statute of limitations is too short117 will show
"frustration of federal policy" sufficient to invoke the doctrine of
Occidental Life. 118
III.

CONCLUSION

The task of placing specific limitations on the prosecution of
legal actions is a legislative function. 119 Perhaps the best resolution of today's confusion would be for Congress to enact a statute
of limitations to govern all federal causes of action not otherwise
limited. 120 Since such congressional action appears unlikely, the
majority. He argued that prohibiting tolling thwarts the congressional policy of providing
multiple remedies, and that the purposes of statutes oflimitations would not be frustrated
by allowing tolling in this situation. 421 U.S. at 472-73. In Johnson, the use of tolling
would have been an appropriate, minor change in the federal limitations framework. Yet
the Court relied on a mere technicality for its refusal to permit the practice. By contrast,
in Occidental Life, the Court ignored technicalities, discarded precedent, and worked a
much larger change with less justification than was present in Johnson.
The facts of Occidental Life also raise the question of whether the holding only applies
when a governmental agency such as the EEOC is suing. The Court did not indicate that
this was an essential fact. Moreover, the Court had previously stated that a private
litigant suing to enforce Title VII "vindicates important congressional policy" and that
the private right of action remains "essential." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 45 (1974). It would therefore seem anomalous to hold that a private litigant using the
Title VII procedure should be barred when suing on his own right whereas that same suit
would be permitted if prosecuted by the EEOC. This has not, however, proved to be a
problem, since lower courts appear to be applying the Occidental Li{e doctrine to suits
by private litigants as well. See Kirk v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 578 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1978);
Wilson v. Continental Group, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
117. Presumably, the government is interested in vindicating all policies expressed
in congressional enactments. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 382-83
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The question, however, is whether this justifies a court
in adopting a limitation period longer than that specified by the analogous state law.
118. Along similar lines, one might argue that a simple lack of uniformity would
sufficiently frustrate federal policy. This view was rejected, however, in UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966).
119. See text at notes 26-36 supra.
120. Several commentators have taken this position. E.g., Blume & George,
/,imitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MtcH. L. REv. 937, 992-93 (1951); Note, supra note
' 36, at 77-78; 32 MINN. L. REv. 65, 68 (1947); 49 YALE L.J. 738, 745 (1940). On a smaller
scale such a statute already exists. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976) limits actions for penalty or
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problem of limiting these actions will probably remain with the
courts.
The options of recognizing causes of action without any limitation and of judicially creating "statutes" of limitations are inappropriate. And since the inherently subjective nature of the
doctrine of laches makes it ill-suited either to clarify or to improve the federal limitations scheme, the Occidental Life approach of using !aches should not be favored. Moreover, when one
considers that the use oflaches has been limited even in equitable
actions, 121 it seems curious to consider expanding its use into legal
actions, a domain to which it historically has not applied. This
leaves the alternatives of borrowing either state or federal statutes of limitations. Despite its drawbacks, there are several reasons for preserving the pracfice of borrowing state statutes of
limitations. It has been the traditional manner of handling the
problem. Moreover, no category of state laws has been more consistently held within the purview of the Rules of Decision Act
than statutes of limitations. 122 It is therefore reasonable t~ infer
that, when Congress explicitly creates a right of action without
also creating a limitation period, it intends to adopt the limitation periods of the states. 123 That inference ought to be a presumption for all congressionally created causes of action. 124
forfeiture. This statute: however, has been construed narrowly. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 236 U.S. 412 (1915).
121. See text at note 91 supra.
,
122. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614 (1895); Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S.
647, 652 (1893). In cases concerning federal rights, the two principal areas historically
covered by the Rules of Decision Act have been statutes of limitations and rules of evidence. See Hill, supra note 36, at 77. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence has
left only statutes of limitations.
123. Hill, supra note 36, at 91. But cf. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352,
1359-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975), in which the court held that "in the
absence of congressional intent to apply state statutes of limitations, such restrictions do
not apply to the EEOC." The court did not explain why the traditional formula should
be reversed in this case.
124. As the Court has recognized, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,704
(1966), if Congress disagrees with the specific application of the presumption, it can
always act to overturn it. But see Bayles, supra note 36, at 652. Standing alone, the
Hoosier Cardinal argument is weak since it can be easily applied to any judicial rule. But
in this instance, against its historical background, it carries weight.
Moreover, Congress has acted to add federal statutes of limitations where state statutes had formerly been borrowed. For example, in response to the situation illustrated by
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895), see text at note 48 supra, Congress added a
statute of limitations to limit patent claims, Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat.
694 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)). And in 1955 Congress added a limitation
provision to the Clayton Act, Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 283 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976)). It has been suggested that these changes occurred only because
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This reasoning, however, does not apply when the right of
action has been implied by the courts rather than created by
Congress. When Congress did not create the cause of action, it is
impossible to infer that it intended to use the standard practice
of borrowing state rules. Under such circumstances, a court may
well borrow a specific federal statute of limitations that already
applies to a similar federal right. If, however, the court determines that there exists no clear congressional limitations policy
toward similar actions, it should conform to traditional practice
and borrow a state statute. 125 If Congress intends something different, it, not the judiciary, should say so.
of the efforts of well organized patent and antitrust bars. Note, A Limitation on Actions
for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 CotuM L. REv. 763, 773 (1968). If this is so, however,
one wonders why rule l0b-5 still has no federal limitation. Surely the securities bar is no
less organized than the antitrust bar.
125. See text at notes 37-44 supra.

